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Introduction
The average unemployment rate for 1997 was
4.9 percent, well below most estimates of the
nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment
(NAIRU).1  One would therefore have expected
to see an increase in inflation in 1997; yet, as
measured by the CPI, inflation fell from 3.3 per-
cent to 1.7 percent (December to December).
This phenomenon of low unemployment ac-
companied by falling inflation has prompted
some observers to claim that the economy is
now operating under a new set of rules. The
explanation is often couched in terms of a
favorable technology shock which has perma-
nently lowered the NAIRU.
This article asks whether economic theory
supports the claim that a technology shock can
change the natural rate of unemployment. This
term is preferred to NAIRU in the context of the
theory used below, which is silent on the deter-
mination of nominal magnitudes like the price
level and inflation.2  Rather, the theory speaks
to the determination of real as opposed to
nominal wages (that is, in terms of goods
rather than dollars). Consequently, changes in
the natural rate of unemployment need not
have any repercussions for inflation.
Proponents of the view that a technology
shock can change the natural rate of unem-
ployment often rely, at least informally, on
neoclassical labor demand and supply. A posi-
tive improvement in technology shifts labor
supply to the right, since firms find all workers
more productive. In equilibrium, total hours
worked and output rise without contributing to
inflation, since improved technology raises the
real wage rate. However, as shown below, the
neoclassical model cannot explain unemploy-
ment per se. Any individual who does not
work has chosen not to work and so cannot be
described as unemployed.
Next, a search model of unemployment is
developed. This environment is characterized
by imperfect information: Workers do not
know the locations of well-paying jobs, and
firms do not know the identities of highly pro-
ductive workers. Consequently, workers must
seek out firms in order to receive wage offers,
n 1 The Economic Report of the President for 1998 estimated a
NAIRU of 5.4 percent, revised down from 5.5 percent in the 1997 report.
n 2 That is, money is neutral:A once-and-for-all change in the level of
the money supply will have a proportional effect on the price level but will
leave all real magnitudes unchanged. In fact, here money will besuper-
neutral:Changes in the time path of the money stock will have no real effect.
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just as firms evaluate potential employees.
Workers choose a reservation wage above
which they accept employment (since the costs
of continued search outweigh the expected
benefits), and below which they reject job
offers (since the opposite is true). In the basic
search unemployment model, a permanent,
positive technology shock will shift the distri-
bution of wages to the right. That is, each
worker is more productive at all potential jobs
and so will receive higher wage offers from any
employer he contacts. Suppose that the costs of
search rise in proportion to productivity. This
will be true if, for example, the only search
costs are forgone wage income and the delay
in receiving a new wage offer. In that case, an
individual’s reservation wage will also rise in
proportion to productivity and the improved
technology will have no effect on the unem-
ployment rate.
If individuals are initially unaware of the shift
in the wage distribution, they will not change
their reservation wages. As a result, the unem-
ployment rate may fall in the short run, since
individuals find a greater proportion of wage
offers meeting their reservation wage. Over
time, as individuals learn of the shift in the
wage distribution, they will revise their reserva-
tion wage upward, and the unemployment rate
will be unchanged. The analysis thus far casts
doubt on a fall in the natural rate of unemploy-
ment that is driven by technology shocks.
Alternatively, if, following a technological
improvement, search costs rise more than
benefits, then the unemployment rate may fall.
Two plausible reasons for this scenario are: 
1) a cap on unemployment insurance benefits,
and 2) unchanged benefits of leisure or home
production opportunities enjoyed during a spell
of unemployment. Both reasons operate by
reducing the effective subsidy rate to search,
thus raising search costs relative to benefits.
The basic search model can be extended to
incorporate search effort. Consider, first, the
problem faced by someone who is unem-
ployed. In choosing his search intensity, he
must make a conjecture about the level of
recruiting by firms which affects his likelihood
of successfully meeting up with a firm. A good
time to be looking for a job is when plenty of
firms are trying to hire. Next, notice that firms
must likewise form a conjecture regarding the
level of search by the unemployed: Posting lots
of job vacancies does not do much good if
there are few unemployed people looking for
work. Owing to these conjectures—or expecta-
tions—regarding the behavior of agents on the
other side of the job market, there may be mul-
tiple equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations.
High and low unemployment equilibria can
exist in an economy with identical fundamen-
tals: The difference is in the expectations of
firms and the unemployed. If the economy
starts in a high unemployment equilibrium, a
positive technology shock may move the econ-
omy to the low unemployment equilibrium.
Firms raise their recruiting efforts since the
value of filling jobs has increased, and the
unemployed increase their search effort as a
consequence. Firms then recruit more, and so
on. The externality to search—for example, that
the unemployed benefit from increased recruit-
ing by firms—-leads to the reinforcing effects of
search effort on both sides of the market. The
net result is an increase in the number of
matches between firms and the unemployed,
hence a lower unemployment rate.
Under the multiple equilibrium story, the
technology shock need not be permanent in
order for the unemployment rate effect to be
permanent. By permanently changing expecta-
tions regarding search effort, even a temporary
technology shock may permanently lower
unemployment. Notice, as well, that old-fash-
ioned Keynesian “pump priming” would have
the same effect. For example, government
could hire people into temporary jobs, increas-
ing the returns to search by the unemployed.
Observing that more individuals are looking for
work, firms will find that the returns to recruit-
ing are higher and so increase their hiring.
Thus, another chain of events is put into
motion which can move the economy from a
high to a low unemployment equilibrium.
A final variant of the search model looks at a
matching function. This model postulates that
the number of successful matches depends on
the number of unemployed persons and on the
number of vacancies posted by firms. Rather
than affecting the productivity of jobs/workers,
suppose that the technological improvement
operates on the matching function: For the
same number of vacancies and unemployed,
more matches are consummated. While this
technological improvement will lower the
unemployment rate permanently, the mechan-
ics are far different from those typically invoked
by the advocates of the “new economics.” Of
course, improvements in the matching function
may be positively correlated with aggregate
productivity gains. For example, computer
technologies are generally credited with much
of the aggregate productivity gains in recent
years, and also make it easier for firms and the
unemployed to contact each other.
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I. The Neoclassical
View of the Labor
Market
In the neoclassical model, the labor market is
like any other. That is, the labor market is
treated as a continuous auction, with equilib-
rium given by the intersection of labor
demand with labor supply (see figure 1). At
the equilibrium wage rate, w*, the quantity of
labor required by firms is just equal to the
number of hours individuals are willing to
work at that wage.
Consider the effects of a permanent im-
provement in technology. Since firms find each
and every worker more productive, they are
willing to offer a higher wage to each one, and
labor demand shifts to the right (see figure 2).
In the new equilibrium, both the labor input
and the wage rate are higher. Since the techno-
logical improvement is permanent, the increase
in the labor input is also permanent.
If firms and workers are fully informed about
all prices in the economy, then it is irrelevant
whether the wage rate discussed above is
expressed in nominal terms (in dollars) or in
real terms (in terms of goods). In the classical
model, money is said to be neutral: The level of
the money supply determines the general price
level, but has no influence on real quantities
like the level of employment. Consequently, the
change in employment owing to an improved
technology need not be inflationary.
Notice that nothing has yet been said of
unemployment. According to the neoclassical
model, there is no unemployment, since any-
one not working at the prevailing wage rate
has chosen not to work; presumably, they have
better things to do with their time. As a conse-
quence, the neoclassical model cannot explain
the current situation of low unemployment and
low inflation.
II. A Basic 
Search Model
Perhaps the most important reason why individ-
uals are unemployed is that they do not know
which firms will offer high wages. Likewise,
firms post vacancies because they are ignorant
of the identities of highly productive workers.3
Each individual in the economy is endowed
with a unit of time. For now, assume that peo-
ple receive no utility from leisure. Thus, when
employed, an individual will supply the entire
unit of time; when unemployed, he will use the
entire unit of time looking for a job.4  Suppose
that each period (for example, a week), an
unemployed individual contacts exactly one
firm. Once contact has been made, both the
firm and the individual learn the individual’s
productivity at that firm. That is, each match
n 3 For a more comprehensive treatment of the model, see Sargent
(1987), Jovanovic (1979), and Lucas and Prescott (1974).
n 4 Equivalently, suppose that the utility cost of working is equal to
that of searching. Then these utility costs wash out of the analysis.
F I G U R E 1
Neoclassical Labor 
Market Equilibrium
F I G U R E 2
A Shift in Labor Demand
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has an idiosyncratic component that depends
on both the firm and the individual. The out-
come of a bargaining process between the firm
and unemployed person will be a wage offer.5
Once a firm and worker have agreed to a
wage, they are assumed to enter a long-term
relationship in which the worker continues
supplying labor to the firm at the agreed wage.6
Now, consider the decision process of an
unemployed individual. This person is assumed
to know the distribution of wages which he
will receive; when he contacts some firm, he
knows the probability of receiving a wage offer
of, say, w. One such distribution is given in fig-
ure 3. This individual must decide whether to
accept a wage offer, w. Suppose that this offer
is quite low, as it would be if his productivity at
a particular firm was also very low. Since decid-
ing to work for a firm means entering into a
long-term relationship with it, agreeing to such
a wage would imply accepting a low wage for
several years. An individual who rejects such an
offer is hoping to receive a higher wage offer
from some other firm in the future. Figure 3
shows that the probability of receiving such an
offer, given by the area under the wage distrib-
ution curve to the right of w, is quite high. Of
course, there is some possibility of receiving an
even lower wage offer, but receiving a higher
wage offer is more likely.
A particularly high wage offer will almost
certainly be accepted, since the chances of
receiving an even higher one are remote. This
means that an individual who rejects a very
high offer in the hope of an even higher one
will have a long wait.
The outcome to the individual’s decision
problem can be summarized by a reservation
wage, wr: The individual will reject all wage
offers below wr and accept all other offers. The
reservation wage balances the costs of contin-
ued search against the benefits. In this model,
the cost of prolonging a search is the wages
lost while the individual waits for a new offer.
The benefit of a longer search is the expecta-
tion of being matched with a firm offering a
higher wage. At wr, the (expected) benefits of
continued search just equal the costs.
Figure 3 shows the probability of receiving a
wage at least equal to the reservation wage.
This is also the probability of an individual
leaving the pool of unemployed. Individuals
choose to be unemployed (in the sense that
they are rejecting wage offers) because it is
rational to do so. A spell of unemployment can
be thought of as an investment in finding a
well-paying job. Since individuals are allocating
themselves to relatively more productive jobs in
the economy, search unemployment is both
privately and socially desirable.
n 5 Assume that the firm always offers a wage rate at which it would
actually be willing to hire the worker. That is, the firm does not lose money
by hiring the worker at the wage offered.
n 6 On-the-job search is ruled out solely in the interests of parsimony.
F I G U R E 3
Wage-Offer Distribution
F I G U R E 4
A Shift in the Wage-
Offer Distribution
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A Permanent
Technology Shock
Suppose that the productivity of all jobs in-
creases. To start, suppose that both firms and
workers are aware of this improvement in pro-
ductivity, and that firms are now willing to pay
10-percent-higher wages. In this case, the dis-
tribution of wages faced by an unemployed
individual will shift to the right, as depicted in
figure 4.
How should an unemployed individual’s
behavior change? It turns out that since all
wage offers have risen 10 percent, his reserva-
tion wage should also rise 10 percent. Increas-
ing the reservation wage in this manner will
imply that the search costs (at this new reserva-
tion wage) will increase 10 percent, as will the
benefits, since all wage offers have increased
10 percent. The original reservation wage
equated the costs and benefits of search, so a
10 percent increase in the reservation wage will
continue to equate the costs and benefits of
search. Given this increase in the reservation
wage, the likelihood that an unemployed indi-
vidual will receive an acceptable offer is
unchanged: All wage offers have risen 10 per-
cent, as has the reservation wage. Conse-
quently, there will be no effect on the unem-
ployment rate. These points are developed in





Now, suppose that while all firms know that the
productivity of all jobs has increased 10 percent,
individual workers are initially unaware of this
improvement in technology. Then the unem-
ployed will have no reason to alter their reser-
vation wage, and as a group they will receive
more acceptable job offers. Equivalently, the
likelihood that an unemployed individual will
receive an acceptable wage offer increases
(compare the shaded areas in figure 5). Under
this scenario, the unemployment rate will fall,
since the job-finding rate has increased.
One would anticipate that, over time, work-
ers will learn about this shift in productivity. As
a result, reservation wages will gradually creep
up until they have risen 10 percent. Once all
workers have found out about the 10-percent
improvement in wage offers, the analysis pro-
ceeds as above when workers were fully in-
formed of the increase in wage offers. That is,
the unemployment rate will fall only in the short
term;7 in the long term, it will be unchanged.
Possibilities for
Long-Run Effects?
Thus far, the analysis has relied on the fact that
search costs increase in proportion to the bene-
fits. Consider two factors which may contribute
to a larger increase in the search costs. First,
most states impose a maximum on unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) benefits. In this context, it
is useful to think of UI benefits as a subsidy to
search. For individuals whose UI benefits are
capped, the 10-percent increase in the wage
offer distribution implies that the subsidy to
unemployment has fallen relative to wages,
effectively increasing search costs. Such individ-
uals should increase their reservation wage by
less than 10 percent in order to reduce the
n 7 The view that the current low unemployment rate is a temporary
phenomenon has been expressed by Federal Reserve Governor Lawrence
H. Meyer, among others. In a recent speech, Meyer (1997) said: “The con-
sensus estimates of NAIRU as this expansion began—about 6 percent—
did not prepare us for the recent surprisingly favorable performance.... my
response is to update my estimate of NAIRU and add other explanations
consistent with this framework, but not to abandon this concept. One pos-
sible explanation is that one or more transitory factors, for the moment, are
yielding a more favorable than usual outcome. A coincidence of favorable
supply shocks is clearly, in my judgment, an important part [of] the answer
to the puzzle.”
F I G U R E 5
An Unanticipated Shift in 
the Wage-Offer Distribution
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costs of search (since a lower reservation wage
implies a shorter duration of unemployment).
Thus, the aggregate unemployment rate should
fall. However, to the extent that legislation
maintains a link between the cap on UI bene-
fits and average wages, this channel for reduc-
ing the unemployment rate will likely be of lim-
ited duration.8
Second, the unemployed may have more
opportunities to pursue leisure and home pro-
duction activities than those who are engaged
in full-time work. These alternative uses of time
also act as a subsidy to unemployment. Sup-
pose, for example, that the value of leisure is
unchanged following a shift in the wage distrib-
ution, then as with maximum UI benefits, the
unemployed should increase their reservation
wage by less than 10 percent (that is, the reser-
vation wage should decrease relative to the
average wage), and the unemployment rate
should fall.
III. Search Intensity
The unemployed can vary their search intensity
by sending out more resumés, filling out more
job applications, calling more employers, or
pursuing prospective jobs more aggressively.
Likewise, employers can alter their search
intensity by posting more job vacancies, using
larger advertisements, assigning more employ-
ees to recruiting, and sending recruiters to
more places where potential employees are
concentrated, such as university campuses. Of
course, these activities are costly to firms.
An individual who increases his search
intensity will reduce the (expected) length of
time between job offers, or equivalently will
increase the number of job offers per unit of
time. The payoff to increased search intensity
by the unemployed will, in turn, depend on the
search intensity of firms: It does little good to
look hard for a job if firms simply are not hir-
ing. Consequently, if the unemployed believe
that firms are recruiting intensively, then the
unemployed will do the same, since they are
more likely to encounter a firm offering an
acceptable wage.
Likewise, if firms believe that the unem-
ployed are searching intensively, then they will
want to do likewise: A good time to be seeking
employees is when lots of people are looking
for jobs. These beliefs of firms and the unem-
ployed are self-fulfilling in the sense that inten-
sive search by the jobless is justified by vigorous
firm recruiting, and vice versa. With high search
intensity on both sides of the job market, unem-
ployment will be low, since many unemployed
individuals are finding suitable jobs.
Of course, a high unemployment equilib-
rium is also possible. In this case, the unem-
ployed do not look very hard for jobs, since
they believe that firms are not engaged in
much recruiting; firms do not recruit heavily
because they believe that the unemployed are
not searching very hard. Again, these beliefs
are self-fulfilling.
Starting from a high unemployment equilib-
rium, consider the effect of a positive technol-
ogy shock that shifts the wage-offer distribution.
Suppose that the unemployed initially increase
their reservation wage in proportion to the shift
in the wage-offer distribution, and do not
change their search effort. Prior to the techno-
logical improvement, firms chose the number of
vacancies to be posted in such a way that the
marginal cost of posting another vacancy just
equaled the (expected) marginal benefit due to
sharing in the surplus created by a successful
match with an unemployed person. For simplic-
ity, assume that the cost of posting a job vacan-
cy is unchanged. Then firms will wish to recruit
more heavily, since the expected marginal ben-
efits of posting a vacancy now exceed the mar-
ginal cost. In response, the unemployed will
find it optimal to increase their search intensity.
Firms, in turn, will want to intensify their
recruiting efforts further, and so on. The net
result is an increase in search effort by both
firms and the unemployed (with the final
increase being larger than the impact effect),
leading to more matches and so to a lower
unemployment rate. That is, a positive technol-
ogy shock may move the economy from a high
to a low unemployment equilibrium. Further-
more, the fall in the unemployment rate will be
permanent, regardless of whether the productiv-
ity shock is permanent or temporary.
Naturally, the shock effecting the move
from a high to a low unemployment equilib-
rium need not be technological. For example,
the government could temporarily hire people
to perform socially useless activities (for exam-
ple, digging holes on even-numbered days,
and filling them in on odd-numbered days). By
n 8 In light of this analysis, one might well ask why the state subsi-
dizes unemployment (through the UI system), since the outcome will nec-
essarily be a higher unemployment rate. Two obvious answers come to
mind. First, some workers are simply unlucky in that they lose their jobs
through no fault of their own. UI benefits allow such individuals to better
smooth their consumption over time. That is, UI is an insurance against
some forms of consumption risk. Second, not all unemployment is neces-
sarily bad. As pointed out above, unemployment can be thought of as an
investment in well-paying jobs. It probably would not be desirable to
require an unemployed person to accept the first job that is offered.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1998 Q322
increasing the economy’s recruiting, the gov-
ernment provides the unemployed with an
incentive to increase their search effort. In
turn, firms will increase their recruiting efforts,
since more unemployed people are looking for
work. Again, a sequence of events is put in
motion which will move the economy to a low
unemployment equilibrium. Once this new
equilibrium is reached, the government can
terminate its hiring activities.
IV. A Matching
Technology
To simplify the analysis somewhat, suppose
that in a given period, an unemployed individ-
ual either will or will not receive a wage offer.
If he receives a wage offer, it is some constant,
w. Likewise, a firm with a vacancy either has a
job applicant or not. All applicants are assumed
to be equally productive, so the firm hires any
applicant, paying the wage rate, w.
The matching technology works as follows:
The number of matches in the economy (that
is, the number of jobless people who success-
fully find work) depends on the number of
unemployed and on the number of job vacan-
cies posted. Of course, the number of matches
cannot exceed the number of unemployed
individuals, nor can it exceed the number of
posted job vacancies. Assume that each unem-
ployed person is equally likely to receive a
wage offer. Likewise, suppose that all firms
posting vacancies are equally likely to have a
job applicant in any given period. The number
of matches in a given period is increasing in
the number of unemployed people looking for
jobs and in the number of vacancies posted by
firms. Finally, the matching technology is typi-
cally assumed to exhibit constant returns to
scale: Doubling the number of unemployed
and the number of vacancies doubles the num-
ber of matches consummated.
Instead of an aggregate technology shock
which affects the productivity of workers on
the job, suppose that the shock affects the rate
at which matches occur. That is, for a given
number of unemployed and vacancies, there
are simply more matches. By way of example,
the Internet has made it easier for employers to
post vacancies and for the unemployed to
search for jobs (particularly in faraway places).
Since the number of matches has increased, the
unemployment rate must fall.
Of course, improvements in the matching
function and in overall economic productivity
may move in tandem. The computer example
is a particularly apt one, since productivity
gains in recent years have been largely attrib-
uted to the adoption and spread of computer
technologies.
V. Conclusions
This article uses economic theory to assess
recent claims that the economy has a new
“speed limit”—that the economy can operate at
a lower unemployment rate without exerting
upward pressure on the inflation rate due to an
improvement in technology. The models ana-
lyzed above embody the classical dichotomy
between the real and nominal sides of the
economy. As a consequence, there need not be
any relationship between inflation and unem-
ployment in these models. The key question is
whether a technological improvement will per-
manently lower the unemployment rate.
In the neoclassical view, the labor market
operates as a continuous auction market. An
implication of this model is that there is no
unemployment; individuals without jobs have
chosen not to work at the equilibrium wage
rate. This observation prompts a look at search
unemployment models.
In the basic search unemployment model,
the outcome of the decision problem faced by
the unemployed is a reservation wage: Offers
below this wage are rejected, while all others
are accepted. In this model, a permanent
improvement in productivity of all jobs which
increases wage offers will, at best, lower the
unemployment rate only temporarily. Once
workers are fully aware of the shift in the
wage-offer distribution, they will increase their
reservation wage so that the fraction of accept-
able wage offers is the same as it was before
the productivity change.
The no-change-in-unemployment result in
the basic search model relies on the assump-
tion that search costs increase by the same pro-
portion as search benefits. Should the costs of
search increase by more than the benefits—
perhaps due to caps on unemployment insur-
ance benefits or the unchanged value of leisure
and home production opportunities which may
be enjoyed in greater abundance when an indi-
vidual is unemployed—then the unemploy-
ment rate may fall.
In an extended search model, both firms and
the unemployed are permitted to vary their ef-
fort. This model can be characterized by multi-
ple rational expectations equilibria. That is,
there can be high and low unemployment
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equilibria whose only difference lies in expec-
tations. Specifically, a low unemployment equi-
librium will result if the unemployed search
hard because they believe that firms are recruit-
ing heavily, and firms recruit energetically
because they believe the unemployed are
searching intensively. Conversely, a high unem-
ployment equilibrium will result if neither side
of the market searches vigorously because each
believes that the other is not searching very
hard. Now, even a temporary technology shock
may move the economy from a high to a low
unemployment equilibrium by initiating a chain
of events that intensifies search efforts by both
firms and the unemployed.
The final model is characterized by a match-
ing technology which depends on the number
of unemployed and the number of vacancies.
Here, a permanent improvement in the match-
ing technology will lead to a lower unemploy-
ment rate.
Most advocates of the “new economy” para-
digm seem to view recent events as an im-
provement in worker productivity, not in the
matching technology. No doubt, many would
be uncomfortable with the multiple equilibria
explanation of events—if only because tradi-
tional Keynesian tools could also move the
economy between equilibria. This leaves the
basic search model, which predicts a permanent
fall in unemployment only if the costs of search
rise by more than the benefits (a scenario that
could result from a cap on unemployment
insurance benefits) or if the technology shock
does not change the value of alternative uses of





The typical worker seeks to maximize expected





Notice that workers are assumed to be risk-
neutral (utility is linear in consumption). 
Wage offers are distributed according to
g(w), which is defined over [w _, w
_
].  The asso-
ciated cumulative density function is G(w)
ºe g(w)dw. Let
wt +1 = 5
0   with probability p
wt with probability 1 – p,
where p is the exogenous separation rate.
The worker’s problem can be cast using the
tools of dynamic programming. The value of
working at a particular wage, w, is given by
V w(w) = w + b[pV u + (1 – p)V w(w)].
Similarly, the value of being unemployed is
given by
V u = G(w r)V u + eV w(w)g(w)dw,
where, as above, w r is the reservation wage
rate. G(w r) is the probability of rejecting a
wage offer, given the reservation wage. Notice
that the reservation wage will have the prop-
erty that
V w (w r) = V u.
The shift in the wage distribution owing to
an improvement in technology should be
thought of as a “stretching out” of the wage-
offer distribution. That is,
G (w) = G ~(w/l) for all w and for all l,
where G ~ is the new wage-offer distribution.
The claim that a technology shock resulting
in a shift in the wage distribution by a factor l
will increase the reservation wage by the same
factor l is now relatively straightforward to see.
In particular, provided the reservation wage
does increase by the factor l, all the quantities
describing the value functions V w (w) and V u
will also rise by the same factor l.
¥
t = 0
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